What behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a "standard rational agent"? In earlier work, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use a set betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) to those explainable via temptation. We argue that set betweenness rules out plausible and interesting forms of temptation including some which may be important in applications. We propose a pair of alternative axioms called DFC, desire for commitment, and AIC, approximate improvements are chosen. DFC characterizes temptation as situations in which given any set of alternatives, the agent prefers committing herself to some particular item from the set rather than leaving herself the exibility of choosing later. AIC is based on the idea that if adding an option to a menu improves the menu, it is because that option is chosen under some circumstances. From this interpretation, the axiom concludes that if an improvement is worse (as a commitment) than some commitment from the menu, then the best commitment from the improved menu is strictly preferred to facing that menu. We show that these axioms characterize a natural generalization of the Gul-Pesendorfer representation.
INTRODUCTION
What potentially observable behaviour can we explain using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a "standard rational agent"? We use the phrase temptation-driven to refer to behaviour explainable in this fashion.
By "temptation", we mean that the agent has some current view of what actions she would like to choose, but knows that at the time these choices are to be made she will be pulled by conicting desires. For clarity, we refer to her current view of desirable actions as her commitment preference since this describes the actions she would commit herself to if possible. We interpret and frequently discuss this preference as the agent's view of what is normatively appropriate, though this is not a formal part of the model. 1 We refer to the future desires that may conict with the commitment preference as temptations. We view this conict as independent of the set of feasible options in the sense that whether one item is more tempting than another is independent of what other options are available. Thus we do impose a certain structure on the way temptation affects the agent. Also, we allow the possibility that the extent or nature of temptation is random, but do not allow similar randomness regarding what is normatively preferred. While there is undoubtedly an element of arbitrariness in this modelling choice, we choose to rule out uncertainty about what is normatively preferred to separate temptation-driven behaviour from the desire for exibility which such uncertainty would generate. 2 We retain uncertainty about temptation for two reasons. First, as we will see, some behaviour which is very intuitive as an outcome of temptation is (unexpectedly) difcult to explain without uncertainty about temptation. Second, we believe that uncertainty about temptations is likely to be important in applications. 3 Our approach builds on earlier work by Gul-Pesendorfer (2001) (henceforth GP) and Dekel-Lipman-Rustichini (2001) (DLR) . DLR consider a rather general model of preferences over menus, from which choice is made at a later date. (A menu can be interpreted either literally or as an action which affects subsequent opportunities.) DLR show that preferences over menus can be used to identify an agent's subjective beliefs regarding her future tastes and behaviour. The set of preferences considered by DLR can be interpreted as allowing for a desire for exibility, concerns about temptation, or both considerations, as well as preferences with entirely different interpretations. 4 GP were the rst to use preferences over menus to study temptation. To see the intuition for how this works, recall that temptation refers to desires to deviate from the commitment preference. The commitment preference is naturally identied as the preference over singleton menus, since such menus correspond exactly to commitments to particular choices. Thus temptation can be identied by seeing how preferences over non-singleton menus differ from what would be implied by the commitment preference if there were no temptation. That is, if {a} {b}, so the agent prefers a commitment of a to a commitment of b, then if there were no temptation (or other "non-standard" motives), we would have {a, b} ∼ {a} since she would choose a from {a, b}. With temptation, though, {a} may be strictly preferred to {a, b}.
Using this intuition, GP focus on temptation alone by adding a set betweenness axiom to the DLR model. As we explain in more detail in subsequent sections, this axiom has the implication that temptation is one dimensional in the sense that for any menu, temptation affects the agent only through the "most tempting" item on the menu. While GP show that this simplication makes a useful starting point, it rules out many intuitive kinds of temptation-driven behaviour. For example, it rules out uncertainty about temptation where the agent cannot be sure which item on a menu will be the most tempting one. We give illustrative examples in Section 3.
We believe that taking account of the multidimensional nature of temptation and uncertainty about temptation is important for applications. In reality, an agent cannot easily "ne tune" her commitments. That is, it is difcult to nd a way to commit oneself to some exact course of action without allowing any alternative possibilities. Instead, real commitments tend to be costly actions which alter one's incentives to engage in "desired" or "undesired" future behaviours. Much of the real complexity of achieving commitment comes from the multidimensional character of temptation. To see the point, rst suppose that the only possible temptation is overspending on current consumption. In this case, the agent can avoid temptation by committing herself to a minimum level of savings. Now suppose there are other temptations that may strike as well, such as the temptation to be lazy and avoid dealing with needed home repairs or other time-consuming expenditures. In this case, the commitment to saving may worsen the agent's ability to deal with other temptations.
Similarly, casual observation suggests that commitments often involve overcommitment (spending more ex ante to commit to a certain behaviour than turns out ex post to be necessary) or undercommitment (nding out ex post that the change in one's incentives was not sufcient to achieve the desired effect). Neither phenomenon seems consistent with a model of tempted but otherwise rational agents unless the model includes uncertainty.
As GP argue, it was natural for them to begin the study of temptation by narrowing to a particularly simple version of the phenomenon. Our goal is to use the DLR framework to build on their analysis and carry out the logical next step in the study of temptation, namely identifying the broadest possible set of behaviour that can be interpreted as that of a tempted but otherwise rational agent. There is a natural analogy to this objective in terms of preferences for exibility. Kreps (1979) characterized a preference for exibility using preferences over menus of deterministic goods. In DLR, we extended his result and characterized the most general class within our framework that yields a preference for exibility using Kreps' monotonicity axiom. As we explain in more detail in the next section, both the axiom involved and the representation it generates seem to be natural ways to characterize those preferences that are driven solely by exibility. Here we would like to do the same for preferences that are driven solely by temptation. Since GP's "one-dimensional" approach imposes more restrictions than just that there is temptation, we broaden their model as much as possible without introducing features other than temptation.
It is important to keep in mind that factors other than temptation may lead to similar behaviour. Hence, while we dene temptation-driven behaviour to be that behaviour consistent with the hypothesis of temptation of an otherwise rational agent, it is not possible to prove that the agent was tempted. Consequently, one might argue that we have been too broad in what we consider to be temptation-related behaviour and have not imposed enough axioms or that we have ruled out some forms of temptation by imposing too many axioms. In Section 4, we argue that our axioms are a reasonable way to identify temptation-driven behaviour. In Section 5, we give some special cases of the representation and the additional axioms which correspond to these as a way of narrowing the range of behaviour to that which is more clearly interpretable as temptation driven. In Section 6, we discuss some possible strengthenings and weakenings of our axioms.
Our analysis is based on a simplied version of DLR, the development of which is another contribution of the present paper. To maintain a unied focus, the text focuses almost entirely on the issue of temptation, and the Appendix contains a complete explanation of how we add a niteness requirement to DLR.
In the next section, we present the basic model and state our research goals more precisely. In the process, we sketch the relevant results in DLR and GP. In Section 3, we give examples to motivate the issues and illustrate the kinds of representations in which we are interested. In Section 4, we give representation results and a brief proof sketch. Section 5 contains characterizations of some special cases. In Section 6, we discuss directions for further research.
THE MODEL
Let B be a nite set of prizes and let (B) denote the set of probability distributions on B. A typical subset of (B) will be referred to as a menu and denoted by x, while a typical element of (B), a lottery, will be denoted by β. The agent has a preference relation on the set of closed non-empty subsets of (B), which is denoted by X.
The basic representation on which we build is called a nite additive EU representation. This adds a nite state requirement to what DLR called an additive EU representation. Formally, we say that a utility function over lotteries, U : (B) → R is an expected-utility function if
for all β (where U(b) is the utility of the degenerate lottery with probability 1 on b). Denition 1. A nite additive EU representation is a pair of nite collections of expectedutility functions over (B), w 1 , . . . , w I and v 1 , . . . , v J such that the function
represents .
DLR, as modied in the corrigendum (Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini and Sarver, 2007) , characterize this class of representations without the niteness requirement. Theorem 6 in the Appendix extends these papers by characterizing nite representations.
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DLR interpret the different utility functions over (B) as different states of the world, referring to the I states corresponding to the w i 's as positive states and J states corresponding to the v j 's as negative states. To understand this interpretation most simply, suppose there are no negative states, i.e., J = 0. Then it seems natural to interpret the w i 's as different utility functions the agent might have at some later date when she will choose from the menu she picks today. At that date, she will know which w i is her utility function and, naturally, will choose the item from the menu which maximizes this utility. Her ex ante evaluation of the menu is the expected value of the maximum. If the w i 's are equally likely, we obtain the value above.
6 This interpretation was introduced by Kreps (1979) , who rst used preferences over sets to model preference for exibility. Clearly, the presence of the negative states makes this interpretation awkward.
One way to reach a clearer understanding of this representation, then, is to rule out the negative states. DLR show that Kreps' monotonicity axiom does this.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity
It is straightforward to combine results in DLR with Theorem 6 to show the following. 5. In addition to niteness, the nite additive EU representation differs from DLR's additive EU representation in three respects. First, DLR included a non-emptiness requirement as part of the denition of an additive EU representation. Consequently, their axioms differ from those of Theorem 6 by including a non-triviality axiom. Second, DLR required that none of the utility functions be redundant. Third, in the innite case, we cannot dene the integration without a measure and, for largely technical reasons, we cannot always take the measure to be Lebesgue. That is, in the innite case, we cannot always have equal weights on all the w i 's and v j 's. By contrast, in the nite case, as is standard with state-dependent utility, we can change the probabilities in essentially arbitrary ways and rescale the w i 's and v j 's to leave the overall utility unchanged. Hence probabilities cannot be identied.
6. As noted in the previous footnote, we cannot identify probabilities, so the interpretation of the w i 's as equally likely is only for intuition.
7. If has a representation with J = 0, it will also have other representations with J > 0 since we can add a v j satisfying v j (β) = k for all β to any representation and not change the preference being represented. This is why DLR imposed a requirement that no "redundant" states are included. For the purposes of this paper, it is simpler to allow redundancy. Intuitively, monotonicity says that the agent always values exibility. Such an agent either is not concerned about temptation or values exibility so highly as to outweigh such considerations. In this case, the nite additive EU representation is easy to interpret as describing a forward-looking agent with beliefs about her possible future needs.
GP's approach provides an alternative interpretation of the nite additive EU representation by imposing a different restriction on that class of preferences. They recognized that temptation and self-control could be studied using this sets of lotteries framework if one does not impose monotonicity. If the agent anticipates being tempted in the future to consume something she currently does not want herself to consume, this is revealed by a preference for commitment, not exibility. GP's (2001) representation theorem differs from Observation 1 by replacing monotonicity with an axiom they call set betweenness.
Axiom 2 (Set betweenness). If x y, then x x ∪ y y.
To understand this axiom, consider a dieting agent's choice of a restaurant for lunch where x, y and x ∪ y are the menus at the three possible restaurants. Suppose x consists only of a single healthy food item, say broccoli, while y consists only of some fattening food item, say french fries. Since the agent is dieting, presumably x y. Given this, how should the agent rank the menu x ∪ y relative to the other two? A natural hypothesis is that the third restaurant would lie between the other two in the agent's ranking. It would be better than the menu with only french fries since the agent might choose broccoli given the option. On the other hand, x ∪ y would be worse than the menu with only broccoli since the agent might succumb to temptation or, even if she did not succumb, might suffer from the costs of maintaining self-control when tempted. Hence x x ∪ y y.
GP introduced the following representation.
Denition 2. A self-control representation is a pair of expected-utility functions (u, v), u : (B) → R, v : (B) → R, such that the function V GP represents where
It is easy to see that this is a nite additive EU representation with one positive state and one negative state where we do a "change of variables", letting w 1 = u + v and v 1 = v. Thus it comes as no surprise that the axioms GP use for this representation include those we use in Theorem 6 to characterize nite additive EU representations. 8 Hence we can paraphrase their result as
Observation 2. (GP, Theorem 1)
has a self-control representation if and only if it has a nite additive EU representation and satises set betweenness.
To interpret GP's representation, note that u represents the commitment preference-the preference over singletons-as V GP ({β}) = u(β) for any β. For any menu x and any β ∈ x, let c(β, x) = max
Intuitively, c is the foregone utility according to v from choosing β from x instead of choosing optimally according to v. It is easy to see that
In this form, it is natural to interpret c as the cost of the self-control needed to choose β from x. Given this, v is naturally interpreted as the temptation utility since it is what determines the self-control cost.
To summarize, consider the set of preferences with a nite additive EU representation. Intuitively, the subset of these preferences which are monotonic corresponds to those agents that value exibility but are not affected by temptation. It seems natural to call such preferences exibility driven, as both the axiom and the representation it generates seem to describe such an agent. In other words, in dening exibility-driven preferences as those that can be explained by exibility considerations alone, it seems natural to conclude that monotonicity characterizes these preferences.
Analogously, we refer to those preferences that have a nite additive EU representation and can be explained solely by a concern about temptation as temptation driven. It seems natural to say that the preferences that satisfy set betweenness are temptation-driven preferences. However, set betweenness does not appear to be as complete a statement of "temptation-driven preferences" as monotonicity is for "exibility driven". In the next section, we give examples of behaviour that seems temptation driven but violates set betweenness, suggesting that set betweenness is stronger than a restriction to temptation-driven preferences. Our goal in this paper is to identify and give a representation theorem for the full class of temptation-driven preferences.
MOTIVATING EXAMPLES AND REPRESENTATIONS
In this section, we give two examples to illustrate our argument that set betweenness is stronger than a restriction to temptation-driven preferences. We also use these examples to suggest other representations of interest.
Example 1.
Consider a dieting agent who wishes to commit herself to eating only broccoli. There are two kinds of snacks available: chocolate cake and high-fat potato chips. Let b denote the broccoli, c the chocolate cake and p the potato chips. The following ranking seems quite natural:
{b} {b, c}, {b, p} {b, c, p}.
That is, if broccoli and a fattening snack are available, the tempting snack will lower her utility, so {b, c} and {b, p} are both worse than {b}. If broccoli and both fattening snacks are available, she is still worse off since two snacks are harder to resist than one.
This preference violates set betweenness. Note that {b, c, p} is strictly worse than {b, c} and {b, p} even though it is the union of these two sets. Hence set betweenness implies that two temptations can never be worse than each of the temptations separately. In GP, temptation is one dimensional in the sense that any menu has a most tempting option and only this option is relevant to the self-control costs.
Intuitively, two snacks could be worse than one for at least two reasons. First, it could be that the agent is unsure what kind of temptation will strike. If the agent craves a salty snack, then she may be able to control herself easily if the chocolate cake is the only alternative to broccoli. Similarly, if she is in the mood for a sweet snack, she may be able to control herself if only the potato chips are available. But if she has both available, she is more likely to be hit by a temptation she cannot avoid. Second, even if she resists temptation, the psychological cost of self-control seems likely to be higher in the presence of two snacks than in the presence of one. 
In DLR's terminology, this representation has two positive states (u + v 1 and u + v 2 ) and two negative states (v 1 and v 2 ). Equivalently, let
Intuitively, the agent does not know whether the temptation that will strike is the one described by v 1 and cost function c 1 (where she is most tempted by the potato chips) or v 2 and cost function c 2 (where she is most tempted by the chocolate cake) and gives probability 1/2 to each possibility. It is easy to verify that V 1 ({b}) = 3, V 1 ({b, c}) = V 1 ({b, p}) = 3/2 and V 1 ({b, c, p}) = 0, yielding the ordering suggested above. Alternatively, dene V 2 by a different generalization of GP:
This representation has one positive state, u + v 1 + v 2 , and two negative states (again v 1 and v 2 ). Here we can think of the cost of choosing β from menu x as
9. GP (2001 GP ( , pp. 1408 GP ( -1409 ) mention this possibility as one reason why set betweenness may be violated.
. This cost function has the property that resisting two temptations is harder than resisting either separately. It is easy to verify that V 2 ({b}) = 3, V 2 ({b, c}) = V 2 ({b, p}) = −1 and V ({b, c, p}) = −5, again yielding the ordering suggested above. We note that there is one odd feature of V 2 . If the agent succumbs to one temptation, she still suffers a cost associated with the other temptation. That is, the self-control cost associated with choosing either snack from the menu {b, c, p} is 6, not zero. Arguably, it should be feasible for the agent to succumb to temptation and incur no self-control cost. We return to this issue in Section 6.
Example 2.
Consider again the dieting agent facing multiple temptations, but now suppose the two snacks available are high-fat chocolate ice cream (i) and low-fat chocolate frozen yogurt (y). In this case, it seems natural that the agent might have the following rankings:
{b, y} {y} and {b, i, y} {b, i}.
In other words, the agent prefers a chance of sticking to her diet to committing herself to violating it so {b, y} {y}. Also, if the agent cannot avoid having ice cream available, it is better to also have the low-fat frozen yogurt around. If so, then when temptation strikes, the agent may be able to resolve her hunger for chocolate in a less fattening way.
Again, GP cannot have this. To see why this cannot occur in their model, note that
That is, we must have {b, i} {b, i, y}.
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To see this more intuitively, note that {b, y} {y} says that adding b improves the menu {y}. As we explain in Section 4, we interpret this as saying that the agent considers it possible that she would choose b from the menu {b, y}, an interpretation we share with GP. However, in GP, the agent has no uncertainty about temptation, so this statement means she knows she will denitely choose b from {b, y}. Consequently, she will denitely not choose y whenever b is available.
11 Hence the only possible effect of adding y to a menu which contains b is to increase self-control costs. Hence GP require {b, i, y} {b, i}.
10. This conclusion does not follow from set betweenness alone but from the combination of set betweenness and independence. It is not hard to show how this preference is ruled out by set betweenness and independence using an argument similar to the one in Appendix C.
11. Note that this conclusion relies on the assumption that temptation does not lead the agent to violate independence of irrelevant alternatives. That is, we are assuming that if the agent would choose b over y from one set, she would never choose y when b is available. See Section 6 for further discussion.
© 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
at Northwestern University Library on September 2, 2011 restud.oxfordjournals.org
Downloaded from
This intuition suggests that uncertainty about temptation is critical to rationalizing this preference. The following simple generalization of GP to incorporate uncertainty allows the intuitive preference suggested above. Let u v b 6 0 i 0 8 y 4 6 and let
This representation has two positive states (u and u + v) and one negative state (v). Intuitively, there is a probability of 1/2 that the agent avoids temptation and chooses according to the commitment preference u. With probability 1/2, the agent is tempted and has a preference of the form characterized by GP. We have
, in line with the intuitive story. The three representations in these examples share certain features. First, all are nite additive EU representations. While we do not wish to argue that the axioms needed for such a representation are innocuous, it is not obvious that temptation should require some violation of them (though see Section 6). Second, in all cases, the representation is written in terms of the utility functions for the negative states and u, the commitment utility. Equivalently, we can write the representation in terms of the commitment utility and various possible cost functions generated from different possible temptations.
Intuitively, the various negative states from the additive EU representation identify the temptations. The various positive states correspond to different ways these temptations might combine to affect the agent. However, all the positive states share a common view of what is "normatively best" as embodied in u. In this sense, there is no uncertainty about "true preferences" and hence no "true" value to exibility, only uncertainty about temptation.
A general representation with these properties is as follows:
where q i > 0 for all i, i q i = 1, and
where u and each v j is an expected-utility function.
Note that i q i = 1 implies that V T ({β}) = u(β), so u is the commitment utility. Intuitively, we can think of each c i as a cost of self-control, describing one way the agent might be affected by temptation. In this interpretation, q i gives the probability that temptation takes the form described by c i .
We can think of this as generalizing GP in two directions. First, more than one temptation can affect the agent at a time. That is, the cost of self-control may depend on more than one temptation utility. Second, the agent is uncertain which temptation or temptations will affect her. It is not hard to show that this representation nests all our examples and GP's representation as special cases.
The following less interpretable representation is useful as an intermediate step.
Denition 4. A weak temptation representation is a function V w representing such that
where q i > 0 for all i, i q i = 1 and
Obviously, a temptation representation is a special case of a weak temptation representation where I = I . The following axiom seems to be a natural part of a denition of temptation driven.
Axiom 3 (DFC: Desire for commitment). A preference satises DFC if for every x
there is some α ∈ x such that {α} x. This axiom says that there is no value to exibility associated with x, only potential costs due to temptation leading the agent to choose some point worse for her diet than α.
On the other hand, DFC only says that exibility is not valued. It does not say anything about when commitment is valued. The second axiom identies a key circumstance in which commitment is strictly valuable, that is, when there is some α ∈ x such that {α} x.
To get some intuition for the second axiom, consider the following example, similar to Example 2, where the three goods are broccoli (b), low-fat frozen yogurt (y) and high-fat ice 12. One way to interpret the weak temptation representation is that it is a limiting case of temptation representations. To see this, x a weak temptation representation with I > I and any ε ∈ (0, 1). We can dene a (strict) temptation representation with I "states" by shifting ε of the probability on the rst I states to the remaining I − I states, adjusting the cost functions at the same time. More specically, deneq i = q i − ε/I for i ≤ I and q i = ε/(I − I ) for i = I + 1, . . . , I. For ε > 0 sufciently small,q i > 0 for all i. For i ≤ I , letĉ i = c i . For i = I + 1, . . . , I, dene new cost functionsĉ i = (1/q i )c i . Consider the payoff to any menu as computed by this temptation representation minus the payoff as computed by the original weak representation. It is easy to see that this difference converges to 0 as ε ↓ 0. In this sense, we have constructed a sequence of temptation representations converging to the weak representation.
cream (i). Assume that {b} {y} {i}, so broccoli is best for the agent's diet and ice cream is worst. As argued above, it seems plausible that adding y to the menu {b, i} improves the menu since y is a useful compromise when tempted. So assume {b, i, y} {b, i}. As we argue below, if adding an item to a menu improves the menu, this is naturally interpreted as implying that the added item is sometimes chosen from the menu. That is, we will conclude from {b, i, y} {b, i} that y is sometimes chosen from the menu {b, i, y}. So with this menu, the agent sometimes breaks her diet, choosing y instead of b. Consequently, we conclude that she strictly prefers committing herself to the broccoli. That is, we conclude {b} {b, i, y}. In addition, if y is sometimes chosen over b and i, it should also be sometimes chosen from the menu {b, y}. Thus the dieter sometimes breaks her diet with this menu too, implying {b} {b, y}. These implications are the content of our next axiom when applied to this example: since adding y improves the menu {b, i}, we require that {b} is strictly preferred to both {b, i, y} and {b, y}.
In short, there are three key steps to the axiom. First, we interpret {b, i, y} {b, i} to mean that y is sometimes chosen from {b, i, y}. Second, since {b} {y}, we conclude that this implies {b} {b, i, y}. Third, we appeal to a kind of "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (IIA) property to conclude that y is also sometimes chosen from {b, y} and that therefore {b} {b, y}.
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More generally, suppose adding β to the menu x strictly improves the menu for the agent in the sense that x ∪ {β} x. In such a case, we say β is an improvement for x. How should we interpret this property? Our goal is to characterize agents who face temptation but are otherwise "standard rational agents". As such, we consider an agent for whom the items on a menu have a certain appeal which is menu independent, an appeal which may create internal conicts which the agent has to resolve. Thus we assume that the normative appeal and the extent of temptation of any given item is independent of the other items in the menu.
In light of this, it seems natural to assume that adding an element to a menu does not make it easier to choose other elements or create value separately from choice. That is, adding an unchosen alternative cannot improve the menu. Hence we interpret x ∪ {β} x as saying that the agent at least considers it possible that she would choose β from the menu x ∪ {β}.
14 We emphasize that this is only an interpretation, not a theorem. We are arguing that our focus on agents who are tempted but are otherwise "standard rational agents" strongly suggests this interpretation, not that it "proves" it.
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Under this interpretation of x ∪ {β} x, what else should be true? Suppose α is the best item for her diet in x (i.e., is optimal according to the commitment preference) and {α} {β}. So α is strictly better for the agent's diet than β and yet she considers it possible that her choice from x ∪ {β} would be β, inconsistent with her commitment preference. Hence she strictly prefers committing herself to α rather than facing the menu x ∪ {β}. That is, commitment is strictly valuable in the sense that {α} x ∪ {β}.
Similarly, consider some x ⊆ x. If the agent considers it possible that she would choose β from x ∪ {β}, it seems natural to conclude that she also considers it possible that she would 13. In Section 6, we discuss the independence axiom and its relation to such IIA-like properties, noting that they may not be appropriate when modelling temptation.
14. Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) also argue for this interpretation of β improving x.
15. There are temptation-related interpretations of x ∪ {β} x in which β is not chosen but which violate the "otherwise rational" part of our focus. For example, if β is a very unappealing dessert, its inclusion in the menu may make it easier for the agent to focus on healthy dishes and hence to stick to her diet. Alternatively, a menu with a larger number of fattening items may create more conict for the agent in choosing among the unhealthy dishes and so, again, may make it easier for her to stick to her diet. We discuss another example in Section 6. choose β from x ∪ {β}. Again, if the best α ∈ x for her diet satises {α} {β}, then the agent would strictly prefer the commitment {α} to facing the menu x ∪ {β}.
To summarize, we interpret x ∪ {β} x to mean that β is sometimes chosen from x ∪ {β} and hence from x ∪ {β} for any x ⊆ x. If the best α ∈ x satises {α} {β}, this implies that the agent does not always choose from x ∪ {β} according to her commitment preferences. Therefore, commitment is strictly valuable for x ∪ {β} in the sense that {α} x ∪ {β}. Since the key to this intuition is that x ∪ {β} x implies β is sometimes chosen from x ∪ {β}, we summarize this by saying improvements are (sometimes) chosen.
16
The axiom we need is slightly stronger. In addition to applying to any β which is an improvement for x, it applies to any β which is an approximate improvement for x. Because of this, we call the axiom AIC, approximate improvements are chosen.
where cl denotes closure. Also, let B(x) denote the set of best commitments in x. That is,
Axiom 4 (AIC: Approximate improvements are chosen). If β is an approximate improvement for x, x ⊆ x, and α ∈ B(x ) satises {α} {β}, then {α} x ∪ {β}.
Theorem 1. has a temptation representation if and only if it has a nite additive EU representation and satises DFC and AIC.
As mentioned earlier, the weak temptation representation, while not as interpretable as the temptation representation, is a natural intermediate point between the nite additive EU representation and the temptation representation. More specically, in the course of proving Theorem 1, we also show
Theorem 2. has a weak temptation representation if and only if it has a nite additive EU representation and satises DFC.
Since GP's self-control representation is a special case of a temptation representation, their axioms must imply ours. That is, for any preference with a nite additive EU representation, set betweenness implies DFC and AIC. A direct proof for AIC involves the other additive EU axioms (continuity and independence, dened in the B Appendix), so we postpone this to Appendix C.
The proof for DFC is simpler. To see it, rst note that if x = {α, β} where {α} {β}, then set betweenness implies {α} x {β}. Thus DFC must hold for all menus with two elements. 16 . One may wonder whether we also require {α} x ∪ {β} if β worsens x instead of improving it-that is, if x x ∪ {β}. In fact, it is not hard to show that such an axiom is necessary as well, though without the approximation issue discussed later. We do not separate out this property since it is not needed for the sufciency proof and hence is implied by the other axioms. Intuitively, there is a natural asymmetry between β improving a menu and β worsening a menu. In the former case, it is natural to interpret the preference as saying β is sometimes chosen. In the latter case, β might be chosen, but might simply be a temptation that the agent manages to avoid but only by incurring self-control costs.
With this in mind, suppose we have shown that DFC holds for all menus with n − 1 or fewer elements. We now show set betweenness 17 implies DFC for all menus with n elements. Fix x with n elements and any α ∈ x. Obviously, if {α} x, DFC is satised for this menu. So suppose x {α}. By set betweenness, x {α} implies x \ {α} x since [x \ {α}] ∪ {α} = x. Since x \ {α} has n − 1 elements, the fact that DFC applies to all such menus implies that there is some β ∈ x \ {α} such that {β} x \ {α} x. Since β ∈ x, we see that DFC is satised for x. This shows that the conclusion of DFC holds for all nite menus. It is not difcult to show that DFC for all nite menus plus continuity (one of the axioms required for the nite additive EU representation) implies DFC for all menus.
Proof sketch
We prove Theorem 1 by rst showing Theorem 2, that is, that DFC implies existence of a weak temptation representation. The key idea is to generalize the "change of variables" we used to derive GP's self-control representation from a one positive state, one negative state additive EU. The idea there was that we begin with a representation of the form
We dene u to be the utility function for singletons, so u = w 1 − v 1 . We then use this to change variables, letting v = v 1 and substituting u + v for w 1 , yielding the self-control representation.
We generalize in the following way. Now we start from I positive states and J negative ones, so the "base" representation is
As before, the main part of the change of variables is writing w i in terms of u and the negative state utilities. In the GP case, this was simple, but here it is not. Here we write each w i as a positive linear combination of u and the v j 's. Further, we will need certain restrictions to interpret the coefcients in this linear combination.
To be specic, suppose there are numbers a i > 0 and b ij ≥ 0, with i a i = 1 and i b ij = 1 for each j such that w i = a i u + j b ij v j for each i. Thus each w i is a positive linear combination of u and the v j 's. We could then substitute into the expression for the representation to obtain
Since the a i 's are positive and sum to 1, they look like probabilities. With some tedious but straightforward algebra, we can rewrite the v j 's into a cost-function form for each i, yielding our temptation representation.
For brevity in what follows, we refer to the above inequalities on the a's and b's as the cross equation restrictions. We refer to a relaxed version allowing a i = 0 for some i as the weak cross equation restrictions. As we explain in more detail below, DFC ensures existence 17. In fact, it is not hard to see that a weaker assumption, positive set betweenness, is sufcient for this argument. See the denition in Section 5. of coefcients satisfying the weak cross equation restrictions. Thus DFC allows the possibility that some of the a i 's are zero. Since the rearranging above to obtain a temptation representation involved dividing by a i , we cannot have a temptation representation in this case. Instead, we obtain the weak temptation representation. 18 The only role of AIC is to ensure that a i > 0 for all i.
The proof that DFC implies existence of the coefcients satisfying the weak cross equation restrictions (and hence giving a weak representation) is based on a separating hyperplane argument. To give some intuition for this result, we prove a simpler result here, namely that each w i can be written as a positive linear combination of u and the v j 's, ignoring the other inequalities in the cross equation restrictions (that is, the summing to 1 of the a i 's and the b ij 's). This proof is connected to a famous result in the literature known as the Harsanyi aggregation theorem (Harsanyi, 1955) . 19 Harsanyi showed that an expected utility function, say W , can be written as a positive linear combination of a nite collection of other expected utility preferences, say U 1 , . . . , U N , if and only if W respects the Pareto ordering generated by U 1 , . . . , U N . Applying this to our setting, we need to show that if u(α) ≥ u(β), and v j (α) ≥ v j (β) for all j , then w i (α) ≥ w i (β) as well. To see that DFC implies this, suppose that the conclusion does not hold, so w i (β) > w i (α). Then using the additive EU representation, we know that the value of the menu {α, β} is
Since w i (β) > w i (α) and max{w k (α), w k (β)} ≥ w k (α), we have
Hence {α, β} is strictly preferred to {α} and {β}, contradicting DFC. In the Appendix, we show that DFC yields all the inequalities of the weak cross equation restrictions.
The sole use of AIC is to ensure that a i > 0 for all i. Before showing that AIC has this implication, we relate the notion of β being an improvement to β being "chosen" by some w i . Suppose we have a nite additive EU representation, a menu y and a lottery β with
so β is an optimal choice for w i from the menu y ∪ {β}. Does this mean β improves the menu y? That is, does this imply y ∪ {β} y? There are two reasons why this strict preference might not hold. First, it could be that there is some other α ∈ y which w i nds just as good as β. In this case, w i does just as well under y as under y ∪ {β}, so we could have y ∼ y ∪ {β}. If this is the only reason why β does not improve the menu y, then we can improve β by an arbitrarily small amount according to the w i preference and this slightly better version of β will improve y. In other words, if this is why β does not improve the menu y, then β will approximately improve y. This consideration is why we need to consider approximate improvements and not just improvements.
For the rest of this argument, then, assume that
18. Intuitively, if we have a w i such that a i = 0, it is very "close" to a w i with a i > 0. This is the reasoning behind the result mentioned in footnote 12.
19. See Weymark (1991) for an introduction to this literature.
Thus adding β to y strictly increases the maximum for w i . This is still not sufcient for concluding that β improves the menu y. It could be that adding β to y also improves the maximum for some of the negative states. In this case, adding β to y could actually make the menu worse for the agent. Lemma 8 shows that in this case we can nd a bigger menu which β does improve. The idea is simple: take any negative state that would improve from the addition of β and add to y some other lottery which that negative state nds just as good as β but which w i likes less than β. Call the collection of these additional lotteries y . Now what happens if we add β to y ∪ y ? By construction, the maximum utility in each of the negative states is unaffected. The maximum utility in state w i is strictly increased by adding β and the maximum utility in other positive states must weakly increase. Hence adding β must improve y ∪ y . In short, if β is optimal over y ∪ {β} for some positive state w i , then it must be true that β is an approximate improvement for y ∪ y for some y .
With this in mind, let us return to the question of why AIC implies a i > 0 for all i. Note that what we need to do is to ensure that each w i is "strictly increasing in u". Intuitively, we need to rule out the possibility that there is an α and β such that u(α) > u(β), v j (α) = v j (β) for all j and w i (α) = w i (β). So suppose there is such an α and β. Hence β is an optimal choice for w i over the set {α, β}. So from the paragraph above (letting y = {α}), we see that there must be some y such that β is an approximate improvement for x = {α} ∪ y . Since u(α) > u(β), we have {α} {β}. If we apply AIC with y = {α} ⊆ x, we see that it implies {α} {α, β}. But from the nite additive EU representation, we see that
Hence we conclude {α, β} {α}, a contradiction. So AIC implies that each a i > 0, completing the proof.
SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we characterize the preferences corresponding to two special cases of temptation representations. Specically, we characterize the "no uncertainty" representation V 2 in (1) of Example 1 and the "uncertain strength of temptation" representation V 3 in (2) of Example 2. These special cases are of interest in part because of the way the required conditions relate to GP's set betweenness axiom. Also, they illustrate how we can narrow the "allowed" forms of temptation in easily interpretable ways. First, consider a representation of the form
which we call a no-uncertainty representation. Equivalently,
where
Note that this representation differs from the general temptation representation by assuming that I = 1-that is, that the agent knows exactly which temptations will affect her. Hence we call this a no-uncertainty representation. This representation, then, generalizes GP only by allowing the agent to be affected by multiple temptations.
If the preference has a nite additive EU representation with one positive state, then we can rewrite it in the form of a no-uncertainty representation by a generalization of the change of variables discussed in Section 2. Specically, suppose we have a representation of the form
The commitment utility u is dened by u(β) = V ({β}) = w 1 (β) − j v j (β). Hence we can change variables to rewrite V in the form of V NU .
The no-uncertainty representation corresponds to half of set betweenness.
Axiom 5 (Positive set betweenness).
satises positive set betweenness if whenever x y, we have x x ∪ y.
For future use, we dene the other half similarly:
Axiom 6 (Negative set betweenness).
satises negative set betweenness if whenever x y, we have x ∪ y y.
The following lemma characterizes the implication of positive set betweenness. To see the intuition, consider a preference with a nite additive EU representation. Suppose satises positive set betweenness but, contrary to our claim, we have two or more positive states. For concreteness, suppose the indifference curves for the various w i 's and v j 's are as shown in Figure 1 . More precisely, suppose there are four states in total, where w 1 and w 2 are two of the positive states. Suppose the lines labelled 1 and 2 are indifference curves for w 1 , the lines labelled 3 and 4 are indifference curves for w 2 and the lines labelled 5 and 6 are indifference curves for the other two states (which could be positive or negative). In all cases, utility is increasing as we move "out"-that is, 2 is a higher indifference curve than 1 for w 1 , 4 is a higher indifference curve than 3 for w 2 and "better" indifference curves for 5 and 6 are further down in the gure. Let x = z 1 ∪ z 2 and let y = z 2 ∪ z 3 . Thus x ∪ y = z 1 ∪ z 2 ∪ z 3 . We claim that it must be true that x ∪ y x. To see this, note that x ∪ y yields the same utility as x in the states corresponding to indifference curves 5 and 6 and in state w 1 . However, x ∪ y yields higher utility than x in state w 2 . That is, the max w i and max v j terms are the same for x and x ∪ y except that the max w 2 term is strictly larger for x ∪ y. Hence x ∪ y x. A symmetric argument implies x ∪ y y, so positive set betweenness is violated, a contradiction. In short, positive set betweenness implies that there can only be one positive state but says nothing about the number of negative states.
20. See also Kopylov (2005) , which gives a generalization to I positive states and J negative states. Figure 1 Using the change of variables discussed above, this lemma obviously yields the following:
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Theorem 3. has a no-uncertainty representation if and only if it has a nite additive EU representation and satises positive set betweenness.
One can modify the proof of Lemma 1 in obvious ways to show the following:
Lemma 2. Suppose has a nite additive EU representation. Then it has such a representation with one negative state if and only if it satises negative set betweenness.
Observation 2 (GP's representation) is obviously a corollary to Lemmas 1 and 2. A second special case takes Lemma 2 as its starting point. This representation has one negative state but many positive states that differ only in the strength of temptation in that state. Specically, we dene an uncertain strength of temptation representation to be one that takes the form
where q i > 0 for all i, i q i = 1, γ i ≥ 0 for all i, and
In this representation, the temptation is always v, but the strength of the temptation (as measured by γ i ) is random. The probability that the strength of the temptation is γ i is given by q i . In a sense, this representation allows the minimum possible amount of uncertainty. Note that this allows I = 2, γ 1 = 1 and γ 2 = 0 as in the representation used in Example 2.
Theorem 4. has an uncertain strength of temptation representation if and only if it has a nite additive EU representation and satises DFC and negative set betweenness.
DISCUSSION
Our goal in this paper is to dene and characterize the set of temptation-driven preferences-that is, those that can be explained in terms of an agent who is tempted but is otherwise a "standard rational agent". In this section, we address the extent to which we have achieved this goal by considering whether we have assumed too little (characterized too large a set of preferences) or too much (characterizing too small a set). In addition, we briey discuss possible extensions of our work.
Extensions
By treating the commitment preference as the agent's view of what is normatively desirable, we have implicitly assumed away uncertainty about what is normatively desirable. At the same time, we have allowed uncertainty about what is tempting or the strength of temptation, suggesting that a more symmetric treatment of normative preference may be of interest. In a sense, though, this problem is too easily solved. More specically, any nite additive EU representation can be written as a temptation representation with uncertainty about normative preferences. To see the point, return to the general nite additive EU representation where
Partition the set {1, . . . , J } into I sets, J 1 , . . . , J I in any fashion. Use this partition to dene I cost functions
just as in the denition of a temptation representation. Dene u i so that u i + j ∈J i v j = w i . Obviously, then, we can write
Interpreting the I states as equally likely, this looks like a temptation representation where the normative preference, u i , varies with i. On the other hand, it is not clear what justies interpreting the u i 's as various possible normative preferences. In our temptation representation, u represents the commitment preference and thus is identied. Note that the inability to identify the u i 's above leads to a more general inability to identify which temptations are relevant in what states since the partition above was arbitrary.
This observation points to another important direction to extend the current model. Our assumption that the normative preference is the commitment preference and hence is state independent allows the possibility that at least some aspects of the representation are uniquely determined (up to some transformation). It is not hard to show that the representation is identied in a natural sense if u and the various v j 's are afnely independent in the sense that these functions (viewed as vectors in R K where K is the number of pure outcomes) and the vector of 1's are linearly independent. With such identication, it is possible to consider how changes in preferences correspond to changes in the representation (i.e., analogs to the correspondence between increased willingness to undertake risk and a lower Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion). For example, DLR show that one preference has an additive EU representation with a larger set of negative states than another if and only if it values commitment more in a certain sense. Since temptation representations have more structure than additive EU representations, there may be new comparisons of interest.
A different approach to achieving identication is to put more discipline on the model by enlarging the set of primitives. Here, the only primitive is the preference over menus. In some of our discussion, particularly in motivating AIC, we interpreted this preference in terms of what it might say about choices from menus. Arguably, a superior approach would be to augment the primitives by bringing in such choices explicitly.
It is not possible to draw denitive conclusions about choices the agent would make from a menu based only on preferences over menus. For example, consider an agent whose preference over menus has a temptation representation. We interpret the representation as saying that the agent assigns probability q i to being tempted according to cost function c i . It seems natural, then, to say that if the agent has menu x, then with probability q i she will choose a β ∈ x which maximizes u(β) − c i (β, x). However, this conclusion is only an interpretation of the model, not a theorem which can be proven. As long as the only primitive in the model is a preference over menus, we have no information about choice from the menu with which to conrm this interpretation. GP resolve this problem by extending the preference over menus to menu-choice pairs, but this approach inherently involves a signicant deviation from the principle of revealed preference. To see the point, let x = {a, b, c} and let * denote this extended preference. Suppose (x, a) * (x, b) * (x, c). GP interpret this as saying that the agent prefers choosing a from x to choosing b from x and prefers choosing b from x to choosing c from x. Hence they conclude that a is chosen from menu x. While this conclusion seems natural, the interpretation of (x, b)
* (x, c) is very puzzling. There is no choice that can reveal this preference to us. If x is the set of choices available, neither b nor c would be chosen by the agent. Asking the agent to compare (x, b) to (x, c) is like asking the agent which she prefers: being offered x but forced to choose b, or being offered x but forced to choose c. In what sense is x the available set if the agent must choose something other than a from the set?
Assuming too little?
We have argued that DFC and AIC are a reasonable way to dene temptation driven on the ground that both the axioms and the resulting representation seem to describe temptation-driven behaviour. On the other hand, the general representation does allow some behaviour that one might interpret as based on other considerations.
One possible instance of this problem was mentioned in the discussion of Example 1. Our general representation allows cost functions that depend on more than one temptation in the sense that we have
where J i need not be a singleton. Such a representation will often have the property that there is no choice the agent can make that reduces c i to 0. One might prefer to assume that if the agent gives in to temptation, the self-control cost is zero. One could argue that when this is not possible, these representations include considerations other than temptation such as regret.
This motivates considering a restriction to what we call a simple representation, a temptation representation with the property that J i is a singleton for all i. Recently, Stovall (2007) has proved a conjecture from an earlier version of this paper that has a simple representation if and only if it has a nite additive EU representation and satises weak set betweenness: Axiom 7 (Weak set betweenness). If {α} {β} for all α ∈ x and β ∈ y, then x x ∪ y y.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that there are reasons why self-control costs might not be zero even if the agent succumbs to temptation. For example, it may be that the agent incurs such costs in a failed attempt to avoid succumbing to temptation, feels guilt or suffers from conict over which temptation to succumb to.
Assuming too much?
Finally, our characterization of temptation-driven behaviour is carried out within the set of preferences with a nite additive EU representation, a set characterized in Theorem 6 in the Appendix. While some of the axioms required seem unrelated to issues of temptation, two of the necessary conditions, continuity and independence (see Appendix for denitions), arguably eliminate some temptation-related behaviour. If so, it may be useful to consider weaker forms of these axioms, thus enlarging the set of preferences considered.
Regarding continuity, GP show that one common model of temptation requires continuity to be violated. Suppose the agent evaluates a menu x according to max β∈B v (x) u(β), where B v (x) is the set of v maximizers in x. Intuitively, the agent expects her choice from the menu to be determined by her later self with utility function v, where her later self breaks ties in favour of the current self. As GP demonstrate, in general, such a representation cannot satisfy continuity.
Regarding independence, there are several temptation-related issues that may lead to violations of this axiom. For example, guilt may lead the agent to prefer randomization, a phenomenon inconsistent with independence. To see the point, consider a dieter in a restaurant faced with a choice between a healthy dish and a tempting, unhealthy dish. Independence implies that such a dieter would be indifferent between this menu and one that adds a randomization between the two. However, with such an option available, the dieter can choose the lottery and have some chance of consuming the unhealthy dish with less guilt than if it had been chosen directly. Hence the indifference required by independence is not entirely compelling. 22 Also, there is a sense in which independence implies that the agent's choices satisfy "independence of irrelevant alternatives". To understand this, note that we represent the agent as if she would face cost function c i with probability q i . Subject to the caveats mentioned in Section 6.1, suppose we interpret the agent who faces menu x as choosing some β which maximizes u(β) − c i (β, x) with probability q i . Substituting for c i , this means that the agent maximizes a certain sum of utilities which is independent of x. Hence if β is chosen over α from menu x, β is chosen over α from any menu, a kind of IIA property. This conclusion is 22. We thank Phil Reny for suggesting this example. The example has a strong resemblance to the "Machina's mom" story in Machina (1989) . See also the earlier discussion of the point in Diamond (1967) . The resemblance suggests that the issue is more about having preferences over procedures for decision making, perhaps driven by temptation, than about temptation given otherwise standard preferences, the case we study here. driven by the linearity of the representation-this causes the max β∈x v j (β) terms to be irrelevant to the max β∈x u(β) − c i (β, x) expression. This linearity comes from independence.
As Noor (2006b) suggests by example, this IIA property is not a compelling assumption for temptation. For a diet-related version of his example, suppose the menu consists only of broccoli and frozen yogurt. Arguably, the latter is not very tempting, so the agent is able to stick to her diet and orders broccoli. However, if the menu consists of broccoli, frozen yogurt and an ice cream sundae, perhaps the agent is much more signicantly tempted to order dessert and opts for the frozen yogurt as a compromise. See also the related criticism of independence in Fudenberg and Levine (2005) .
Related to the earlier discussion of guilt, issues of guilt and its ip side, feelings of "virtuousness", may be important aspects of temptation and pose new modelling challenges. To see the point, we again let b denote broccoli, y frozen yogurt and i ice cream and assume {b} {y} {i}. Suppose the agent knows she will choose y from any menu containing it. Then it seems plausible that {y, i} {y} {b, y}. Intuitively, the rst preference comes about because the agent can feel virtuous by choosing frozen yogurt over the more fattening ice cream, a feeling which the agent cannot get from choosing yogurt when it is the only option. Similarly, the second preference reects the agent's guilt from choosing frozen yogurt when broccoli was available, a feeling not generated by consuming frozen yogurt when there is no other option. Note that the rst of these preferences contradicts our main axiom, DFC, since it implies {y, i} {y} {i}. This story also runs contrary to the motivation for our AIC axiom: here, adding i improves the menu {y} but does so because it is not chosen. While the preference {b} {y} {b, y} is consistent with our general representation, it is not consistent with a simple representation. In particular, with guilt, an agent who succumbs to temptation does not avoid all costs. We suspect that an adequate treatment of these issues requires moving beyond the class of nite additive EU representations.
APPENDIX A. NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Throughout the Appendix, we use u, v j , etc., to denote utility functions as well as the vector giving the payoffs to the pure outcomes associated with the utility function. When interpreted as vectors, they are column vectors. Let K denote the number of pure outcomes, so these are K by 1. We write lotteries as 1 by K row vectors, so β · u = u(β), etc. Also, 1 denotes the K by 1 vector of 1's.
APPENDIX B. EXISTENCE OF FINITE ADDITIVE EU REPRESENTATIONS
It is simpler to work with the following equivalent denition of a nite additive EU representation. Denition 6. A nite additive EU representation is a pair of nite sets S 1 and S 2 and a state-dependent utility
represents and (ii) each U (·, s) is an expected-utility function in the sense that
The relevant axioms from DLR are:
Axiom 8 (Weak order).
is asymmetric and negatively transitive.
Axiom 9 (Continuity). The strict upper and lower contour sets, {x ⊆ (B) | x x} and {x ⊆ (B) | x x }, are open (in the Hausdorff topology).
Given menus x and y and a number λ ∈ [0, 1], let λx + (1 − λ)y = {β ∈ (B) | β = λβ + (1 − λ)β , for some β ∈ x, β ∈ y} where, as usual, λβ + (1 − λ)β is the probability distribution over B giving b probability λβ (b) + (1 − λ)β (b).
Axiom 10 (Independence). If x x , then for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and all x,
We refer the reader to DLR for further discussion of these axioms.
The new axiom which will imply niteness requires a denition. Given any menu x, let conv(x) denote its convex hull.
Denition 7. x ⊆ conv(x) is critical for x if for all y with
Intuitively, a critical subset of x contains all the "relevant" points in x. It is easy to show that the three axioms above imply that the boundary of x is critical for x, so every set has at least one critical subset.
Axiom 11 (Finiteness).
Every menu x has a nite critical subset.
Theorem 6. has a nite additive EU representation if and only if it satises weak order, continuity, independence and niteness.
Necessity is straightforward. The sufciency argument follows that of DLR by constructing an articial "state space", S K , then restricting it to a particular subset. To do this, write B = {b 1 , . . . , b K }. Let S K = {s ∈ R K | s i = 0, s 2 i = 1}. In line with our notational conventions, we write elements of S K as K by 1 column vectors. For any set x ∈ X, let σ x denote its support function. That is, σ x : S K → R is dened by
As explained in DLR, our axioms imply that if σ x = σ x , then x ∼ x .
To prove sufciency, x any sphere, say x * , in the interior of (B). By niteness, x * has a nite critical subset. Let x c denote such a subset. We claim that we may as well assume x c is contained in the boundary of x * . To see this, suppose it is not. For every point in x c , associate any line through this point. Letx c denote the collection of intersections of these lines with the boundary of x * . Obviously,x c is nite. Also, it is easy to see that conv(x c ) ⊆ conv(x c ). In light of this, consider any convex y ⊆ x * and supposex c ⊆ y. Then
So y ∼ x * . Hencex c is a nite critical subset of x * which is contained in the boundary of x * . So without loss of generality, we assume x c is contained in the boundary of x * . Since x * is a sphere, there is a one-to-one mapping, say g, from the boundary of x * to S K where g(β) is the s such that β is the unique maximizer of α · s over α ∈ x. That is, g(β) is the s for which we have an indifference curve tangent to x * at β. Let
That is, x is the polytope bounded by the hyperplanes tangent to x * at the points in x c . The rest of the proof focuses on this menu.
Lemma 3. x c is critical for x.
Proof. Obviously, x c ⊂ x. Fix any convex y such that x c ⊆ y ⊆ x. We show that y ∼ x.
To show this, x any ε > 0 and let
Note that x c ⊆ y ε ⊆ y. Also, y ε → y as ε ↓ 0 since x c ⊆ y ⊆ x. We claim that
Obviously, σ (B) (s) − α 1 · s is bounded from above. Hence it is sufcient to show that the right-hand side of the inequality is bounded away from zero for s ∈Ŝ. To see that this must hold, suppose there is a sequence {s n } with s n ∈Ŝ for all n with σ x * (s n ) − α 1 · s n → 0. Clearly, this implies s n →ŝ. But then
implying that we cannot have s n ∈Ŝ for all n, a contradiction. Hence such a λ must exist.
Lemma 4. If y is any set with σ y (s) = σ x (s) for all s ∈ S * , then y ∼ x.
Note: The x referred to here is again the menu dened in equation (B1).
Proof. Fix any such y. Without loss of generality, assume y is convex. (Otherwise, we can replace y with its convex hull.) Clearly,
since otherwise y would contain points, giving it a higher value of the support function for some s ∈ S * . But the set on the right-hand side is x, so y ⊆ x. Obviously, then if x c ⊆ y, the fact that x c is critical for x implies y ∼ x. So suppose x c ⊆ y. As noted, we must have y ⊆ x. So let y λ = λx + (1 − λ)y. Obviously, y λ converges to x as λ → 1. For each β ∈ x c , there is a face of the polyhedron x such that β is in the (relative) interior of the face. Also, y must intersect the face of the polyhedron and so y λ must intersect the face. As λ increases, the intersection of y λ with the face enlarges as it is pulled out toward the boundaries of the face. Clearly, for λ sufciently large, β will be contained in the intersection of y λ with the face of x which contains β. Take any λ larger than the biggest such λ over the nitely many β ∈ x c . Then x c ⊆ y λ ⊆ x. Since x c is critical for x, this implies λx
Lemma 5. For any y andŷ such that σ y (s) = σŷ (s) for all s ∈ S * , we have y ∼ŷ.
Proof. Fix any such y andŷ. For any λ ∈ [0, 1), dene u λ : S * → R by
Because σ y (s) = σŷ (s) for all s ∈ S * , it would be equivalent to use σŷ instead of σ y . Let
Obviously, λσ y (s) + (1 − λ)u λ (s) = σ x (s) for all s ∈ S * . This implies that for all λ ∈ (0, 1), λy
To see this, note that for any α ∈ y and β ∈ z λ ,
Note also that u λ (s) → σ x (s) as λ ↓ 0. We claim that this implies that there is a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every s ∈ S * , there exists β ∈ z λ with β · s = u λ (s). To see this, suppose it is not true. Then for all λ ∈ (0, 1), there existŝ But u λn → σ x as n → ∞. Hence the limit as n → ∞ of the right-hand side, namely x, cannot equal the limit of the left-hand side, a contradiction. Hence, there is a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every s ∈ S * , there is a β ∈ z λ with β · s = u λ (s). Choose such a λ and let u = u λ and z = z λ . Obviously, for every s ∈ S * , there is α ∈ y with α · s = σ y (s). Hence, given our choice of λ, for every s ∈ S * , there is γ ∈ λy + (1 − λ)z such that γ · s = λσ y (s) + (1 − λ)u(s) = σ x (s). Hence, σ λy+(1−λ)z (s) = σ x (s) for all s ∈ S * . Hence, Lemma 4 implies λy + (1 − λ)z ∼ x. The symmetric argument withŷ replacing y implies λŷ + (1 − λ)z ∼ x. So, λy + (1 − λ)z ∼ λŷ + (1 − λ)z. By independence, then, y ∼ŷ.
DLR show that weak order, continuity and independence imply the existence of a function V : X → R which represents the preference and is afne in the sense that V (λx + (1 − λ)y) = λV (x) + (1 − λ)V (y). Fix such a V . Let U = {(σ x (s)) s∈S * | x ∈ X} ⊂ R M where M is the cardinality of S * . Let σ |S * denote the restriction of σ to S * . Dene a function W : U → R by W (U) = V (x) for any x such that σ x |S * = U . From Lemma 5, we see that if σ x |S * = σ x |S * , then x ∼ x so V (x) = V (x ). Hence W is well dened. It is easy to see that W is afne and continuous and that U is closed and convex and contains the 0 vector. It is easy to show that W has a well-dened extension to a continuous, linear function on the linear span of U. Since U is nite dimensional, W has an extension to a continuous linear functional on R M . (See Lemma 6.13 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) , for example.) Since a linear function on a nite-dimensional space has a representation by means of a matrix, we can write
where the c s 's are constants and U = (U s ) s∈S * . Hence,
Hence, we have a nite additive EU representation.
APPENDIX C. RELATING GP'S AXIOMS TO AIC
As noted in the text, since GP's self-control representation is a temptation representation, our existence theorem implies that GP's axioms imply AIC. Here we show this conclusion directly from the axioms. More specically, we show that continuity, independence and set betweenness imply AIC.
Suppose β is an approximate improvement for x, y ⊆ x, α ∈ B(y) and {α} {β}, but the conclusion of AIC does not hold. That is, we do not have {α} y ∪ {β}. Since we have already shown that GP's axioms imply DFC, we know that {α} y ∪ {β} since α ∈ B(y ∪ {β}). Hence if AIC fails, it must be true that {α} ∼ y ∪ {β}. Since {α} {β}, this implies y ∪ {β} {β}.
Since β is an approximate improvement for x, we can nd a β * arbitrarily close to β such that x ∪ {β * } x. Since β * can be made arbitrarily close to β, continuity and y ∪ {β} {β} imply that we can choose β * so that y ∪ {β * } {β * }. Independence and x ∪ {β * } x imply
Also, y ∪ {β * } {β * } and independence imply
It is not hard to see, however, that y ⊆ x implies
Hence this contradicts set betweenness.
APPENDIX D. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Lemma 6. Suppose has a nite additive EU representation of the form Proof. Suppose not. Let Z denote the set of KI by 1 vectors (z 1 , . . . , z I ) (so each z i is a K by 1 vector) such that
for scalars a i , b ij and c i satisfying the conditions of the lemma. So if the lemma does not hold, the vector (w 1 , . . . , w I ) / ∈ Z. Since Z is obviously closed and convex, the separating hyperplane theorem implies that there is a vector p such that
Write p = (p 1 , . . . , p I ) where each p i is a 1 by K vector. So
Equivalently, Write p i as (p 1i , . . . , p Ki ). Without loss of generality, we can assume that |p ki | ≤ 1/K for all k and i. (Otherwise we could divide both sides of the inequality above by K max k,i |p ki | and redene p i to have this property.) Let β denote the probability distribution (1/K, . . . , 1/K). For each i, let α i = p i + β. Note that α ki = p ki + 1/K and so α ki ≥ 0 for all k, i. Also, α i · 1 = p i · 1 + β · 1 = 1. Hence each α i is a probability distribution.
By denition of u, i w i = u + j v j . Hence this is
But this contradicts DFC. We now prove Theorem 2. The necessity of having a nite additive EU representation is obvious. For necessity of DFC, suppose has a weak temptation representation. For any menu x and any i = 1, . . . , I , let α i denote a maximizer of u(β)
where the rst inequality uses c i (β, x) ≥ 0 for all i, β, and x and the last one uses q i > 0 and For i / ∈ I + ,
Also,
Hence V is a weak temptation representation.
APPENDIX E. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Obviously, if has a temptation representation, it has a weak temptation representation, so DFC and existence of a nite additive EU representation are necessary. Hence the following lemma completes the proof of necessity. Recall that B(x) = {α ∈ x | {α} {α }, ∀α ∈ x}.
Lemma 7. If has a temptation representation, then it satises AIC.
Let V T be a temptation representation of . Let β be an approximate improvement for x. Fix any x ⊆ x and α ∈ B(x ) such that {α} {β}. (If no such x, β, x and α exist, AIC holds trivially.) By denition of an approximate improvement, there exists a sequence β n converging to β such that x ∪ {β n } x for all n.
For any menu z,
Clearly, then, the fact that V T (x ∪ {β n }) > V T (x) implies that for each n, there is some i with
Otherwise, all the maximized terms in the rst sum would be the same at z = x as at z = x ∪ {β n }, while the terms being subtracted off must be at least as large at z = x ∪ {β n } as at z = x. Let i * n denote any such i. Because there are nitely many i's, we can choose a sub-sequence so that i * n is independent of n. Hence we can let i * = i * n for all n. Hence Clearly, then, since x ⊆ x,
Subtract j ∈J i * max γ ∈x ∪{β} v j (γ ) from both sides to obtain
where c i * is the self-control cost for state i * from the temptation representation.
Recall that α ∈ B(x ). Hence we have
where the two weak inequalities follow from c i (γ , x ∪ {β}) ≥ 0 and the strict inequality follows from q i * > 0 and {α} {β}. Hence {α} x ∪ {β}, so AIC is satised.
Turning to sufciency, for the rest of this proof, let denote a preference with a nite additive EU representation V .
Before moving to the main part of the proof of sufciency, we get some special cases out of the way. First, it is easy to see that if has a nite additive EU representation, then it has such a representation which is non-redundant in the sense that no w i or v j is a constant function and no two of the w i 's and v j 's correspond to the same preference over (B). On the other hand, this non-redundant representation could have I = 0, J = 0, or both. We rst handle these cases, then subsequently focus on the case where I ≥ 1, J ≥ 1, no state is a constant preference and no two states have the same preference over lotteries.
If I = J = 0, the preference is trivial in the sense that x ∼ x for all x and x . In this case, the preference is obviously represented by the temptation representation
where v and u are constant functions. If I = 0 but J ≥ 1, then we have
for an arbitrary constant A. Let w 1 denote a constant function equal to A and dene u = w 1 − j v j . Then
giving a temptation representation. Finally, suppose J = 0. To satisfy DFC, we must then have I = 1, so V (x) = max β∈x w 1 (β) + A for an arbitrary constant A. Let v 1 be a constant function equal to A and dene u = w 1 − v 1 . Then obviously
giving a temptation representation.
The remainder of the proof shows the result for the case where the nite additive EU representation has I ≥ 1 positive states and J ≥ 1 negative states, none of which is constant and no two of which correspond to the same preference over menus. Following GP, we refer to this as a regular representation.
Lemma 8. Suppose has a regular, nite additive EU representation given by
Fix any interior β and any menu x such that for some i,
Then there exists x such that β is an approximate improvement for x ∪ x .
Proof. Fix such a β, x and i. By hypothesis, the additive EU representation is regular, so w i is not constant. Because w i is not constant and β is interior, for any ε > 0, we can nd aβ within an ε neighbourhood of β such that w i (β) > w i (β). Hence w i (β) > max α∈x w i (α).
LetĴ denote the set of j such that
For each j ∈Ĵ , we can nd a γ j such that v j (γ j ) > v j (β) and w i (γ j ) < w i (β). To see that this must be possible, note that the selection of j implies that w i and −v j do not represent the same preference. By hypothesis, the additive EU representation is regular, so w i and v j do not represent the same preference and neither is constant. Hence the v j indifference curve through β must have a non-trivial intersection with the w i indifference curve through β. Hence such a γ j must exist. Let x denote the collection of these γ j 's. (IfĴ = ∅, then x = ∅.) Let β λ = λβ + (1 − λ)β. By construction, for all λ ∈ (0, 1), w i ranks β λ strictly above any α ∈ x. Also, since w i (β) > w i (γ j ) for all j , there is a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that w i (β λ ) > w i (γ j ) for all j for all λ ∈ (λ, 1). Also, for every j / ∈Ĵ , v j ranks some point in x (and hence in x ∪ x) at least weakly above both β andβ and hence above β λ . Finally, for every j ∈Ĵ , v j (γ j ) > v j (β). Hence there is a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that v j (γ j ) > v j (β λ ) for all j ∈Ĵ and all λ ∈ (λ , 1). Let λ * = max{λ, λ }. For λ ∈ (λ * , 1), then,
Since the w i comparison of β λ to any α ∈ x or any γ j is strict, this expression is
Recall that B(x) is the set of α ∈ x such that {α} {α } for all α ∈ x. Dene a menu x to be temptation-free if there is an α ∈ B(x) such that {α} ∼ x. Lemma 9. Suppose satises AIC and has a regular, nite additive EU representation. Fix any interior β and any x such that x ∪ {β} is temptation free and β / ∈ B(x ∪ {β}). Then there is no i with
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose β is interior, x ∪ {β} is temptation free, β / ∈ B(x ∪ {β}), and there is an i with From Lemma 8, we know that there is an x such that β is an approximate improvement for x ∪ x . Because β / ∈ B(x ∪ {β}), we know that u(β) < max α∈x u(α), where u is dened by u(γ ) = V ({γ }) as usual. By AIC, then, x ∪ {β} cannot be temptation free, a contradiction.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we use the following result from Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 22.2, pp. 198-199 It is easy to use this result to show that if we have some equality constraints, we simply drop the requirement that the corresponding λ's are non-negative.
Fix with a regular nite additive EU representation which satises DFC and AIC. We use Lemma 10 to show that there exists a 1 , . . . , a I , b 11 , . . . , b I J , and c 1 , . . . , c I such that Because DFC implies that a weak temptation representation exists, the part of the system with only weak inequality constraints is obviously consistent. To state the alternatives implied by the lemma most simply, let λ ik denote the real number corresponding to the equation Assume that no a i 's, b ij 's and c i 's exist satisfying the conditions postulated, so a solution exists to this system of equations. Note that we cannot have a solution to these equations with λ ik = 0 for all i and k. To see this, note that the third equation would then imply µ = ψ i for all i and hence µ > 0. Also, from the fourth equation, we would have µ j = ϕ ij and hence µ j ≥ 0 for all j . But then the last equation gives µ + j µ j ≤ 0, a contradiction. Since k λ ik = 0, this implies max i,k λ ik > 0. Without loss of generality, then, we can assume that λ ik < 1/K for all i and k. (Recall that there are K pure outcomes.) Otherwise, we can divide through all equations by 2K max i,k |λ ik | and redene all variables appropriately.
Rearranging the equations gives For each i, dene an interior probability distribution α i by α i (k) = (1/K) − λ ik . Because λ ik < 1/K for all i and k, we have α i (k) > 0 for all i and k. Also, k α i (k) = 1 − k λ ik = 1. Letting β denote the probability distribution (1/K, . . . , 1/K), we can rewrite the above as The rst inequality implies
with a strict inequality for some i. The second inequality implies Hence x is a temptation-free menu. Note that the rst equality in the last equation implies that α i maximizes w i for all i. Also, the second equality together with equation (E3) implies that the weak inequalities in equations (E1) and (E2) must be equalities. In particular, then,
However, recall that u(β) + µ ≥ u(α i ), ∀i with strict inequality for some i.
That is, there must be some k for which u(α k ) < max i u(α i ). where I ≥ 2. Without loss of generality, we can assume that w 1 and w 2 represent different preferences over (B)-otherwise, we can rewrite the representation to combine these two states into one. Letx denote a sphere in the interior of (B). Let 
APPENDIX G. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. Necessity is obvious. For sufciency, assume has a nite additive EU representation and satises DFC and negative set betweenness. We know from Lemma 2 that it has only one negative state. Using this and Lemma 6, we see that can be represented by a function V of the form 
